Abliteration

Abliterated models, with the refusal taken out of the weights.

An abliterated model is an open-weight model with its refusal direction subtracted from its weights. We serve one, Cyber v1, and every figure on this page was measured on it.

Refusals

1in 100

Held-out harmful prompts, reasoning on. The base model refused 92.

KL divergence

0.136

How far its first token moved on 100 harmless prompts. Unchanged is 0.

Edited

38tensors

The attention output of blocks 2 to 39. Every other weight is byte-identical.

Kept

0prompts

Zero retention by architecture, on machines we run in Europe.

How abliteration works

All three steps work on the weights. pqhaz made the ones Cyber v1 runs with Heretic.

Find the direction

Run a few hundred harmful and a few hundred harmless instructions through the model and average its residual stream at the last prompt token for each set. The difference between the two averages is the direction the model moves along when it is about to refuse. There is one per block.

Subtract it

Project that direction out of the weights that write into the residual stream, so the model can no longer move along it. Nothing is trained and no data is added: the edit is arithmetic on weights that already exist, and every weight it doesn't touch stays byte for byte the same.

Check what moved

Count refusals on prompts the direction was not measured on, and measure how far ordinary answers moved (the KL divergence on harmless prompts). Push the edit too hard and the model breaks: it runs words together or repeats a fragment.

What it changed on Cyber v1

Cyber v1 is DeepSeek V4.1 Flash 1017 with 38 tensors edited: the attention output projection of blocks 2 to 39, at strength 2.5. The routed experts are stored in FP4, which can’t hold an edit this size, so they stay as DeepSeek shipped them.

The first five figures are from the model card pqhaz published with the weights. The last is ours, run on the build that answers your requests.

Refusals, reasoning on
92 in 100 for the base model, 1 in 100 abliterated, on held-out harmful prompts
Refusals, chat
97 in 100 for the base model, 1 in 100 abliterated (JailbreakBench, held out)
KL divergence
0.136 on the first token for 100 harmless prompts, where 0 is unchanged
Broken long outputs
0 of 128 for both, across long prose, code and reasoning
Median answer length
357 tokens for the base model, 1,517 abliterated, on the same harmful prompts: it answers where the base refused
The build we serve
0.96 on 200 GSM8K maths questions, and 0 broken answers in 16 tool-calling runs (our checks, 14 November 2026)

A stronger edit

A stronger edit takes out more refusals and moves more of the model. At 2.0 three prompts in 100 were still refused; at 2.5 none were, for a small rise in KL. Editing the shared expert as well raised the KL and took out no more refusals, so it was dropped.

Edit
Refusals in 100KL
Attention, strength 1.75
160.109
Attention, strength 2.0
30.125
Attention, strength 2.5 (Cyber v1)
00.136
Attention, strength 3.0
00.160
Attention 2.5 and shared expert 1.0
10.247

Abliterated or uncensored

Providers use the two words as if they meant the same thing. They describe different edits, and neither word tells you how often the model still refuses.

Abliterated
One direction subtracted from the weights. No training and no new data; the rest of the model is unchanged.
Uncensored
Usually a finetune on data with the refusals filtered out, which retrains more of the model. The word is also used for unchanged weights.
What to ask
How many prompts in 100 it still refuses, on a set it wasn’t tuned on, and how far it moved on ordinary ones.

Where it runs

Several providers sell an abliterated DeepSeek V4.1 Flash 1017. What differs between them is where your prompts go and what is kept. This is what each provider’s own page said on 14 November 2026.

NODECODE
On machines we run in Europe, and nowhere else. Zero retention by architecture: prompts and answers are never stored.Our privacy page
abliteration.ai
In the United States by default, with an EU data-residency option. Prompts and completions are processed in memory and never stored by default.Its data handling page
Venice
On Venice-controlled GPUs or zero-data-retention partners. Its Pro tier runs in hardware enclaves, with end-to-end encryption. No prompt or response is stored, which it enforces by contract with its partners.Its privacy page
Lyber
Operated by a United States company. Working toward complete zero data retention. Its web chat keeps history, encrypted, by default.Its privacy page

Questions

Short answers about abliteration and Cyber v1.

An abliterated model has had its refusal direction removed from its weights. A model's refusals come from one direction in its residual stream; abliteration measures that direction on harmful and harmless prompts and subtracts it, so the model answers instead of refusing. Nothing is trained and no data is added.

Not quite. An uncensored model is usually finetuned on data with the refusals filtered out, which retrains more of it, and the word is also used for unchanged weights. Abliteration is one edit to the weights. Whichever a provider sells, ask how many prompts in 100 it still refuses.

A little. On DeepSeek V4.1 Flash 1017 the KL divergence on harmless prompts is 0.136, long outputs broke no more often than the base model's (0 of 128), and the build we serve scored 0.96 on 200 GSM8K maths questions. A stronger edit moves the model further, and too strong an edit breaks it.

pqhaz abliterated DeepSeek V4.1 Flash 1017 with Heretic's method and publishes the weights on Hugging Face as DeepSeek-V4.1-Flash-1017-heretic. We serve them as Cyber v1, with our own finetunes.

Yes, the weights are public. The model is 510 GB in its native FP8 and FP4 format, and its card serves it on four GPUs with tensor and expert parallelism. If you would rather not run that, call it here with a key and an OpenAI-compatible base URL.

No. There is no KYC, no application and no waiting list: pay by card or by coin, take a key, point a base URL at it.

To machines we run in Europe, and nowhere else. Nothing on the way is written to disk. We keep token counts per key, in fifteen-minute buckets over a five-hour window, and never a prompt or an answer.

Hosted in Europe

Every request to Cyber v1 runs on machines we operate in Europe, and nowhere else.

ZDR
Zero data retention. Your prompts and answers are private and never stored or logged on our servers.
TLS
Encrypted in transit. Your requests are encrypted on every network hop, from your agent to the machine that runs the model.
GDPR
Data protection. Your requests are processed in Europe, only to answer you, under European privacy law.